Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 86
Issue 4 Summer

Article 9

Summer 1996

Waiver of the Plea-Statement Rules
Michael S. Gershowitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Michael S. Gershowitz, Waiver of the Plea-Statement Rules, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1439 (1995-1996)

This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

00914169/96/8604-1439
THEJOMRNAL

OF CRIMINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY

Copyright © 1996 by Northwestern University, School of Law

Vol. 86, No. 4
Prind in U.S.A.

WAIVER OF THE PLEA-STATEMENT RULES
United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Mezzanattol the United States Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant could waive his right to the plea-statement exclusionary provisions embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence
4102 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e) (6) 3 ("Rules" or
"plea-statement Rules").4 The Rules currently provide that statements
made by a criminal defendant during plea negotiations with a prosecutor are inadmissible in a proceeding against the defendant. 5
Mezzanatto involved a criminal defendant who, prior to settlement
negotiations, waived the plea-statement Rules for impeachment purposes at the behest of the prosecutor. 6 In holding that a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable,
Justice Thomas, writing for a seven person majority, relied in large
part on the general presumption that criminal defendants can waive
statutory, contractual and even the most fundamental constitutional
7
rights.
This Note argues that the majority, ignoring the plain language
and legislative history of the plea-statement Rules, improperly placed
the Rules within the general presumption favoring waiver. In addition, this Note argues that prosecutors cause defendants to enter into
contracts of adhesion by demanding that they waive the plea-statement Rules. This Note further contends that the Court's opinion affirms the growing practice of prosecutors to demand waiver of the
plea-statement Rules automatically, thereby circumventing the Rule's
exclusionary provisions. Writing in dissent, Justice Souter correctly
warned that the Court's decision could ultimately allow defendants to
waive the protections of the plea-statement Rules for use in the government's case in chief.
1 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).

2 FED. R. EI D. 410.

3 FED. Rt. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).

4 The plea-statement Rules are "substantively identical." Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 801.
5 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (6); FED. R. EvID. 410. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying
text for the text of the plea-statement Rules.
6 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 800.
7 Id. at 801, 806.
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BACKGROUND

410

AS ENACTED IN

1974

In promulgating the original version of Federal Rule of Evidence
410, the Advisory Committee indicated that the purpose of excluding
offers to plead guilty or no/o contendere was to promote the resolution
of criminal cases by compromise. 8 The plea-statement Rules are
rooted in cases that examine the practical difficulties of admitting evidence of withdrawn guilty pleas. 9 While the Judiciary Committees of
the House and Senate agreed on the basic premise that courts should
exclude withdrawn pleas, they differed in their views on admitting
statements related to plea negotiations.' 0 The Senate's view that
courts could admit plea statements for impeachment purposes and in
prosecutions for perjury ultimately prevailed in the first version of
Rule 410.11
As originally enacted, Rule 410 included the following explicit exceptions admitting plea statements, "[t]his rule shall not apply to the
introduction of voluntary and reliable statements made in court on
the record... where offered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent prosecution of the declarant for perjury or false statement."
While the original version of the Rule allowed plea statements for impeachment purposes, it also indicated that it would not take effect
until August 1, 1975, and that any subsequent amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure inconsistent with the Rule would
supersede it.1 2 OnJuly 31, 1975, the day before the original version of
8 FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 228 (1972).
9 See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (admitting into evidence a withdrawn guilty plea would undermine the defendant's right to withdraw the plea and jeopardize his right to a fair trial); People v. Spitareli, 173 N.E.2d 35 (N.Y. 1961) (admitting the
withdrawn plea would force the accused to take the stand in order to account for the plea
and its withdrawal).
10 Compare H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974

U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082 (House Committee on the Judiciary reporting that statements
made in connection with pleas should be inadmissible for any purposes) with S. REP. No.
1277, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057 (Senate
Committee on the judiciary indicating that to deter defendants from lying "with impunity"
statements made in connection with a plea that are determined to be reliable should be
admissible for impeachment purposes and in subsequent perjury prosecutions).
11 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.CAN. 7098, 7100. However, the joint conference also recognized that the issue of
admitting withdrawn pleas and statements connected to those pleas warranted further exploration and indicated the anticipated consideration of Rule 11 (e) (6) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure would provide the opportunity to address the issue further.
The Conference also stated its intention that any subsequently enacted Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure inconsistent with Rule 410 would supersede it. Id.
12 FED. R. EviD. 410, Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1933
(1975).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 410 was to take effect, Congress amended
Rule 11 (e) (6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The provision of Rule 410 regarding the admissibility of plea statements for impeachment purposes did not survive the superseding inconsistency of
13
Rule 11 (e) (6).
B.

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

410,

AS AMENDED IN

1975

When Congress amended Rule 410 in order to bring it into conformity with Rule 11 (e) (6), the most notable change was the omission
of the exception allowing plea statements to be used for impeachment
purposes. The House Committee on the Judiciary recognized the use
of plea statements in a subsequent prosecution for perjury as the only
14
exception to the exclusionary rule.
In amending Rule 11 (e) (6) in 1975, Congress explored the use
of plea statements in subsequent proceedings in greater depth than it
did in passing the original version of Rule 410.15 After reconsidering
the plea-statement Rules, Congress opted to adopt the House version
of the Rule, which notably declined to recognize an exception for impeachment purposes. 16 Because Rule 11 (e) (6), the basis for the 1975
amendments to Rule 410, took effect prior to the enabling date of the
original version of Rule 410, the only version of the Rule that contained a provision recognizing an exception for impeachment was
17
never in force.
C.

THE CURRENT VERSION OF THE PLEA-STATEMENT RULES

Congress' major objective in revising the plea-statement Rules in
1980 was to define with greater precision the inadmissibility of evi8
dence relating to pleas or statements made during plea negotiations.'
Prior to the 1980 revisions, the only exception to the Rules concerned
pleas or plea statements used in prosecutions for perjury. 19 In creating a more precise rule, Congress added a second exception to the
13 Comparethe original FED. R. EVID. 410, supra note 12, with the amended version of
FED. . CRIM. P. 11(e) (6), 28 U.S.C. App. (1976).
14 H.P REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CAN 674,

679.
15 See supra note 11.

16 H.R. CoNF. RP. No. 414,94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
713, 714; United States v. Chapman, 718 F. Supp. 1390, 1392 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (case law
supports assertion that "Congress had considered, but explicitly rejected ... an exception
for impeachment use of statements covered by the Rule").
17 United States v. Martinez, 536 F.2d 1107, 1108 (5th Cir. 1976).
18 FED. R. CRuM. P. 11(e) (6) Advisory Committee's Note, 77 F.R.D. 507, 533 (1978).
19 FED. R EvI. 410, 28 U.S.C. App, at 149 (1976).
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general rule of non-admissibility.2 0 The new exception made plea
statements admissible "in any proceeding wherein another statement
made in the course of the same plea discussions had been introduced
and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it."21 In its effort to make the plea-statement Rules more
precise, Congress declined to add an exception recognizing a waiver
of the exclusionary rule. 22 The current version of the plea-statement

Rules reads in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is
not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an
attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of
guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding
wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for
perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the
defendant
23
under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.
D.

THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS

The circuits have taken different approaches regarding the absence of an explicit exception providing for waiver of the plea-statement Rules. In United States v. Dortch,24 the Seventh Circuit concluded
that a criminal defendant can waive his right to the exclusionary provisions of the plea statement Rules prior to entering into plea negotiations with a prosecutor. 25 The Dortch court relied on the general
presumption that defendants may waive their rights, without considering why the plea-statement Rules might fall outside this general presumption.2 6 While Doritch held that a defendant may waive the pleastatement Rules for impeachment purposes only, the case indicated
that the Seventh Circuit will tolerate an even more expansive waiver of
27
the exclusionary protections of the Rules.
20 Id.
21 FED. R. CRIM. P.
22 See United States

11(e)(6); FED. R. EVID. 410.
v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1982) ("We regard this legislative history as demonstrating Congress' explicit intention to preclude use statements made
in plea negotiations for impeachment purposes.").
23 FED. R. CuM.P. 11(e)(6); FED. R. EVID. 410.
24 5 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1993).
25 Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1068; see also United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1409 (7th
Cir. 1992).
26 Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1068-69.
27 Id. at 1068. The court noted that the only question before it was whether the defend-
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The Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result in U.S. v. Mezzanatto,
concluding that a criminal defendant cannot waive the protection of
the plea-statement Rules.28 The appellate court considered the exclusionary provision to be absolute, with only two explicitly proscribed
exceptions.2 9 In addition, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the pleastatement Rules from rights and protections more personal in nature,
and concluded that because the exclusionary provisions were procedural safeguards to protect the whole system of plea-bargaining, they
were beyond the control of individual defendants and prosecutors.8 0
The Second and Tenth Circuits also addressed the use of plea
statements for impeachment purposes.3 ' While neither circuit directly addressed the issue of waiver, both circuits provided support for
the position that the plea-statement Rules cannot be waived. The Second Circuit rejected the use of plea statements for impeachment because "[c]alculations as to use for impeachment purposes will clearly
affect the discussions and impair the frank and open atmosphere
Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) were designed to foster. '32 The Tenth Circuit, after citing the Ninth Circuit's rejection of waiver of the pleastatement Rules in Mezzanatto, explicitlyjoined the Ninth Circuit's position and held that plea statements were inadmissible for impeach33
ment purposes.
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 1, 1991, San Diego Narcotics Task Force (SDNTF)
Agents executed a search warrant at the Rainbow, California, residence of Gordon Shuster.3 4 The agents arrested Shuster after discovant waived the protections of the plea-statement Rules for impeachment purposes. Id In
examining the defendant's waiver of the plea-statement Rules, the court determined that
the defendant waived the protections for any purpose other than for use in the prosecutions case in chief. Id. This limitation was not based on any interpretation of the pleastatement Rules themselves, but rather on the terms stated in the defendant's proffer letter. Id. It seems to follow that if the terms of a proffer letter waives the exclusionary
protection for all purposes, courts will allow unrestricted use of statements made in plea
negotiations.
28 United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993).
29 Id. at 1454. The court was reluctant to add a third exception in the absence of any
evidence that Congress intended there to be one: "Given the precision with which these
rules are generally phrased, the comparative recentness of their promulgation, and the
relative ease with which they are amended, the courts can afford to be hesitant in adding
an important feature to an otherwise well-functioning rule." Id. at 1456.
30 Id.
31 SeeUnited States v. Acosta-Ballardo, 8 F.3d 1532, 1536 (10th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 692-94 (2d Cir. 1982).
32 Lawson, 683 F.2d at 692.
33 Acosta-Ballardo, 8 F.3d at 1536.
34 Brief for Petitioner at 2, United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995) (No. 93-
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ering a methamphetamine laboratory at his residence.3 5 Shuster
agreed to cooperate with the agents, and several hours after his arrest,
contacted defendant-respondent Mezzanatto through Mezzanatto's
pager.3 6 When Mezzanatto responded to the pager, Shuster told him
a friend wanted to purchase a pound of methamphetamine for
$13,000.37 In addition, Shuster said that the friend would "front" even

more money to purchase another pound of the narcotic to be deliv39
ered later.3 8 Shuster arranged to meet Mezzanatto later that day.

Pursuant to Shuster's arrangements, he and Mezzanatto met at a local
40
restaurant that evening.
At the restaurant, Shuster introduced an undercover officer as his
"friend."4 1 The officer asked Mezzanatto if he had "brought the stuff
with him," and Mezzanatto indicated that it was in his car.42 The of-

ficer then accompanied Mezzanatto to the car, where Mezzanatto produced a brown paper package. 43 The officer inspected the package,
which contained approximately one pound of methamphetamine,
and asked how long it would take to obtain the second pound.44 Mezzanatto responded that it would take about six hours. 4 5 Mezzanatto
then produced a glass pipe (later found to contain methamphetamine
residue) and asked the officer if he wanted a "hit." 6 The officer said
he would first get Mezzanatto's money, and, as he left the car, he gave
a prearranged arrest signal.4 7 Mezzanatto was then arrested and
charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1).48
On October 17, 1991, Mezzanatto and his attorney requested a
meeting with the prosecutor to discuss the possibility of cooperating
with the government. 49 The prosecutor agreed and met with Mezzanatto and his attorney later that day. 50 Prior to the meeting, Mez1340).
35 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 800.
36 Id.
37 Id.

38 Petitioner's Brief at 2, Mezzanatto (No. 93-1340).
39 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 800.
40 Petitioner's Brief at 2, Mezzanatto (No. 93-1340).
41 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 800; Petitioner's Brief at 2, Mezzanatto (No 93-1340).
42 Id.
43 Id.

44 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Mezzanatto (No. 93-1340).
45 Id.

46 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 800.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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zanatto consulted with his attorney for about five minutes. 5 1 At the
outset of the meeting, the prosecutor advised Mezzanatto that he was
not obligated to talk, but that if he chose to divulge information, it
would have to be completely truthful.5 2 The prosecutor conditioned
continuing the meeting on Mezzanatto's agreement that the government could use any statements he made during the discussion to im*peach inconsistent statements he might make at trial in the event the
case reached that stage.5 3 After conferring with his lawyer, Mezzanatto agreed to the prosecutor's conditions, and the meeting
54
continued.
During the meeting, Mezzanatto admitted that he knew the package he attempted to sell to the undercover police officer contained
methamphetamine; however, he also stated that, prior to his arrest, he
dealt only in one ounce quantities of methamphetamine. 55 Mezzanatto also initially claimed that he did not know about the
methamphetamine laboratory at Shuster's Rainbow residence, and
that he was only acting as a broker for Shuster.5 6 Later on in the
meeting, however, Mezzanatto admitted that he knew about the laboratory.5 7 Attempting to, minimize his involvement in Shuster's operation, Mezzanatto claimed that he had not visited the Rainbow
property for at least a week prior to his arrest.5 8 In response, the government confronted Mezzanatto with surveillance evidence that
showed his car on the Rainbow property the day before the arrest.5 9
Citing Mezzanatto's failure to offer completely truthful information,
60
the prosecutor ended the meeting.
Mezzanatto's case proceeded to trial, where he opted to take the
stand in his own defense.6 1 Mezzanatto testified that he thought
62
Shuster used his laboratory to manufacture explosives for the CIA.
In addition, Mezzanatto denied any involvement in methamphetamine trafficking and claimed that he did not know the package he
delivered to the undercover police officer contained methamphet51 Brief for Respondent at 1, United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995) (No. 931340).
52 Mezranatto, 115 S. Ct. at 800.
53
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

58

Id.

59 Id.

60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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amine. 63 Mezzanatto described his involvement in the events leading
to his arrest in the context of his belief that Shuster was employed by
64
the CIA.
Over the objection of defense counsel, the prosecutor cross-examined Mezzanatto about his statements from the October 17 meeting that were inconsistent with his trial testimony. 65 Mezzanatto
denied ever stating that he knew the package contained
methamphetamine or that he trafficked the narcotic in one ounce
quantities. 66 The prosecutor then impeached Mezzanatto by calling
an agent who had attended the October 17 meeting to recount the
67
prior statements.
The jury convicted Mezzanatto, and the District Court sentenced
him to 170 months in prison. 68 Mezzanatto appealed his conviction,
arguing that he could not waive the Rules' exclusion of his plea negotiation statements, even for the limited purpose of impeachment. 69 A
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
7
Mezzanatto's conviction. 0
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the scope and
legislative history of the plea-statement Rules indicated that Congress
expressed an "explicit intention to preclude use of statements made
in plea negotiations for impeachment purposes. '71 The court also discussed the importance of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system and the need to encourage frank discussion at the negotiation
stage. 72 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that allowing waivers to the pleastatement Rules' protections would contradict Congress' clear intent
to foster plea settlements. 73 In addition, the court concluded that
Congress could easily amend the Rules if it determined that they
should include a waiver exception."
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 75 to
determine whether a criminal defendant could waive the exclusionary
protections provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e) (6) and to resolve the inconsistency
63 Id.

64
65
66
67
68

Petitioner's
Mezzanatto,
Petitioner's
Mezzanatto,
Id. at 801.

Brief at 5, Mezzanatto (No. 93-1340).
115 S. Ct. at 800.
Brief at 6, Mezzanatto (No. 93-1340).
115 S. Ct. at 800-01.

69 Id.
70 United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1993).

71 Id. at 1454 (quoting United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1982)).
72 Id. at 1454-55.
73 Id. at 1455.
74 Id. at 1456.

75 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).

PLEA-STATEMENT RULES

1996]

1447

among the circuits. 76
IV.
A.

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

MAJORITY OPINION

In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, 77 the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, holding that a defendant
can waive the exclusionary protections of the plea-statement Rules. 78
The Court first addressed the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Congress intended to preclude waiver agreements that circumvent the
protections offered in Rules 410 and 11(e)(6). 7 9 Justice Thomas
wrote that absent an indication that Congress intended to preclude
waiver, the Court generally presumes that parties can waive statutory
provisions through voluntary and knowing agreements.8 0 Referring to
protections such as the double jeopardy defense, compulsory self-incrimination and the right to ajury trial, the Court stated: "[a] criminal
defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution."8 1
The Court then indicated that cases specifically addressing the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure comport with the general notion
of the presumptive availability of waiver.8 2 Justice Thomas added that,
generally, the Federal Rules of Evidence accommodate a presumption
of waiver, referring specifically to evidentiary stipulations that preclude subsequent objections regarding the authenticity of documents
or the use of hearsay.8 3 "Because the plea-statement Rules were enacted against a background presumption that legal rights generally,
and evidentiary provisions specifically, are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties," the Court declined to read into the
Rules any preclusion of waiver.8 4 Relying on the freedom of contract
76 Compare United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1993) with United States v.
Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1993).
77 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Breyerjoined injustice Thomas' opinion.
78 United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806 (1995).
79
80
81
82

Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.

Id. The Court recognized that the inclusion of an express waiver clause in a rule
could indicate that Congress intended to preclude waiver in circumstances not specifically
stated. Id. at 801-02. The Court referred to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 43 and
7(a) as examples of rules where Congress precluded waiver, and then distinguished them
from the rules at issue in Mezzanatto's case. Id. at 802.
83 Id.

84 Id. at 803. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals refused to read a waiver into the rules
as an additional exception to the exclusion provision because of the "precision with which
these rules are generally phrased . . .and the relative ease with which they can be
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and the latent presumption of the waivability of most legal rights and
protections, the Court indicated that Mezzanatto bore the burden of
affirmatively establishing that the plea-statement Rules could not be
85
set aside by agreement.
The Court then addressed the three arguments suggested by Mezzanatto for concluding that the Rules were beyond the control of the
parties. Mezzanatto's first argument, that the plea-statement Rules
provide the criminal defendant with an unwaivable guarantee of fair
procedure, failed to persuade the Court that a defendant could never
relinquish the protection of the exclusionary provisions.8 6 Justice
Thomas responded to Mezzanatto's argument by discussing the need
to protect the reliability of the fact-finding process as a whole, rather
than addressing the guarantee of procedural fairness to an individual
defendant. 87 He focused on the likelihood that the "admission of
plea statements for impeachment purposes" will enhance "the truth88
seeking function of trials and will result in more accurate verdicts."
The Court also rejected Mezzanatto's second argument, that
waiver of the plea-statement Rules is fundamentally inconsistent with
Congress' goal of encouraging voluntary settlement.8 9 The Court
noted that prosecutors, like defendants, have an interest in setting
cases, and that one tool to encourage settlement is to offer
prosecutorial leniency or full immunity in exchange for information.9 ° Justice Thomas recognized that because prosecutors have limited resources, they cannot easily investigate the credibility of
information they receive from a cooperating defendant.9 ' He then
reasoned that prosecutors gain some promise of receiving reliable information when defendants waive their protection of the plea-statement Rules for impeachment purposes. 92 Justice Thomas speculated
that without such an assurance of receiving reliable information, prosecutors might be deterred from entering into plea negotiations or co93
operation discussions.
Finally, the majority addressed Mezzanatto's third argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct and the large disparity in bargainamended." United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993).
85 United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 803 (1995).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 804.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92
93

Id.
Id. at 805.
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ing power between the government and criminal defendants. 9 4 The
Court determined that the possibility of prosecutorial fraud or coercion could be best addressed on a case-by-case basis.95 The Court established the presumption that "absent some affirmative indication
that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an
agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement
Rules is valid and enforceable." 96 Finding that Mezzanatto made no
showing that he acted unknowingly or involuntarily, the Court refused
to recognize prosecutorial overreaching or abuse as a basis to invali97
date his waiver agreement.
Because Mezzanatto failed to establish any basis upon which to
challenge the presumption of the waivability of the plea-statement
Rules' protections, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of
98
appeals.
B.

JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Ginsburg included a short concurring opinion 9 9 in which
she clarified her understanding of the Court's opinion:
The Court holds that a waiver allowing the Government to impeach with
statements made during plea negotiations is compatible with Congress'
intent to promote plea bargaining. It may be, however, that a waiver to
use such statements in the case-in-chief would more severely undermine
a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea bargaining. As the Government has not sought such a waiver, we do not here

explore this question.' 00
C.

JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENT

Relying heavily on the plain meaning, congressional intent and
legislative history of the plea-statement Rules, Justice Souter authored
a dissenting opinion' 01 in which he challenged the majority's decision
and explored possible ramifications of the Court's holding. 0 2 Justice
Souter referred to the "unconditional" language of the plea-statement
Rules as a possible basis to determine that they do not permit
waiver.' 0 3 He indicated that the combination of the directive, "except
94 Id.

95 Id. at 806.
96 Id.
97 Id.

98 Id.

99 Justices O'Connor and Breyer joined justice Ginsburg's opinion.

100 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). This is Justice Ginsburg's

concurrence in its entirety.
101 Justice Stevens joined injustice Souter's opinion.
102 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 806-09 (SouterJ., dissenting).
103 Id. at 806-07 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence . . . is not admissible

against the defendant . . .,,'o4 and the absence of any provision allowing waiver provided a strong basis for "[b] elievers in plain meaning" to conclude that parties cannot waive the Rules by agreement.' 0 5
Acknowledging the majority's reliance on the general presumption
favoring waivers of rights, Justice Souter then analyzed whether the
presumption should operate in regard to the plea-statement Rules. 106
First, Justice Souter looked to the Advisory Committee Notes to
the Rules to determine if Congress revealed its intention regarding
waiver.1 0 7 Justice Souter recognized that the Notes convey two clear
assumptions made by Congress when it adopted the Rules. 10 8 First, in
light of the underlying fact that the judicial system could not resolve
at trial every civil and criminal case filed, Congress intended the Rules
to encourage plea discussions and settlements. 0 9 Second, Congress
determined that conditions of unrestrained candor represent the
most effective means of encouragement. 10 Justice Souter determined
that these two assumptions demonstrate that Congress enacted the
Rules to create something more than a personal right solely to protect
individual defendants."' Instead, Justice Souter determined that
Congress enacted the Rules to serve the interests of the entire judicial
system.112 Justice Souter maintained that Congress cannot "be presumed to have intended to permit waivers that would undermine the
stated policy of its own Rules.""13 Consequently, he concluded that
4
individual defendants cannot waive the Rules' protections."
Justice Souter also argued that Congress could not have intended
to allow a waiver exception to the provisions by referencing the potential consequences of treating the plea-statement Rules as default provisions in the absence of a waiver agreement.11 5 He noted that under
current practice, many prosecutors already utilize standard forms that
require defendants to waive their rights under the Rules as a condition to entering into plea negotiations." 1 6 Referring to the govern104 FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(e)(6); FED. R. EVID. 410.
105 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 807 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

107 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 808 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 807-08 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 808 (Souter, J., dissenting).
111 Id. (Souter,J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
113 Id. (SouterJ., dissenting) (citing Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704
(1945)).
114 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (Souter,J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 808-09 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ment's concession that defendants generally have no choice but to
comply with prosecutorial requests for wavier agreements, Justice Souter warned that the majority's opinion would cause the waiver exception to the plea-statement provisions to overcome the Rules
themselves.1 1 7 In addition, he emphasized that the Rules draw no distinction between the use of a statement for impeachment and for use
in the case-in-chief. 118 Consequently, Justice Souter warned that the
majority's opinion opened the door to allow defendants to waive the
plea-statement exclusionary Rules for any use by the prosecutor.' 19
Lastly, the dissent revisited the fact that the Court's opinion permits prosecutors to require waiver agreements simply as a condition to
enter into negotiations. 120 As a result, the possibility exists that a defendant who wants merely to enter a guilty plea will be unable to do so
"without furnishing admissible evidence against himself then and
there."' 2 ' Justice Souter concluded that he was unable to reconcile
the potential ramifications of the majority's opinion with Congress'
intention in adopting the Rules "to promote candid discussion in the
22
interest of encouraging compromise."'1
V.

ANALYSIS

This Note argues that the Supreme Court improperly determined
that a criminal defendant could waive the protections of the pleastatement Rules. In part A, this Note asserts that the general presumption favoring the availability of waiver should not apply to the
plea-statement Rules. Part B argues that because the plea-statement
Rules protect the legislatively favored plea-bargaining system, their
provisions are beyond the control of the parties to litigation. In part
C, this Note argues that agreements to waive the plea-statement Rules
are unenforceable contracts of adhesion. Finally, part D of this Note
examines the likely ramifications of the Court's decision.
A.

THE GENERAL PRESUMPTION FAVORING WAIVER SHOULD NOT APPLY

TO RULES

410

AND

11 (e)(6)

The general presumption supporting the ability to waive rights
and protections should not apply to the plea-statement Rules. Both
the majority and dissenting opinions agree that, generally, a waiver of
117 Id. at 809 (Souter, J., dissenting).

118
119
120
121
122

Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 809-10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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rights is presumptively available.' 23 While Justice Souter makes no
attempt to dispute the existence of the general presumption, he persuasively argues that Congress enacted the plea-statement Rules with
the intention of precluding waiver, thereby rendering irrelevant the
general presumption relied upon by the majority.124 Both the plain
language of the plea-statement Rules and their legislative history support Justice Souter's position that the Rules fall outside the scope of
this general presumption.
1.

The Plain Language of the Rules Prohibits an Implied Waiver

Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e) (6) each clearly state, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant." The Rules then explicitly
25
state two exceptions, neither of which provides for waiver.1
Crosby v. United States,126 a case cited by the majority, addressed
how to interpret rules that include the "except as otherwise provided"
language.1 2 7 Crosby analyzed Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which contains an "except as otherwise provided" phrase
similar to the one included in the plea-statement Rules.' 28 Rule 43
establishes a defendant's right to be present at criminal proceedings
against him; however, Rule 43 also explicitly provides for several instances where the defendant is considered to have waived his right to
be present. 129 In Crosby, a unanimous Court'3 0 stated:
123

Id. at 801, 806.

124

Id. at 806 (Souter,J., dissenting).

125

The only two instances where the Rules do not bar the admissibility plea-statements

are:
(i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same
plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be
considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or
false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record
and in the presence of counsel.
FED. R. GRIM. P. 410, FED. R. EVID. 11(e)(6).
126 113 S. Ct 748 (1993).
127 Id. at 751.
128 Id.
129 FED. R. CuM. P. 43. The Crosby Court specifically analyzed the following language of
Rule 43:
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at
the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and
the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.
(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of the trial to and
including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be
considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially
present,
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced ....
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The Rule declares explicitly: "The defendant shall be present.., at
every stage of the trial... except as otherwiseprovided by this rule." The list
of situations in which the trial may proceed without the defendant is
marked as exclusive.., by the express use of a limiting phrase. In that
respect the language and structure of the Rule could not be more
13

,
clear.
The Crosby Court was unwilling to recognize any exceptions to
132
Rule 43 other than those explicitly stated in the text of the rule.
The Court in Crosby specifically refused to recognize a waiver exception that was broader than an exception defined in the text of the
rule.'3 3 Crosby's unambiguous interpretation of the "except as otherwise provided" language indicates -that the plea-statement Rules also
contain an exclusive list of exceptions. Because waiver by the defendant is not provided for in the plea-statement Rules, the majority erred
by recognizing an unnamed waiver exception.
The majority in Mezzanatto suggested that Rule 43's inclusion of a
limited waiver exception provides the basis for excluding other waiver
exceptions and distinguishes it from the plea-statement Rules in a
manner that prevents the Rules from barring waiver.' 8 4 The majority,
however, was incorrect. The majority argued that in defining one

waiver exception in drafting Rule 43, Congress "occupied the field"

and precluded consideration of other waiver exceptions. 135 By relying
on the concept of "field occupation" the majority argued that an explicit mention of a limited wavier in a Rule is a necessary element to
preclude waiver in other, unnamed circumstances.'1 6 The majority
then concluded that because the plea-statement Rules do not mention
any waiver exceptions, waiver of their provisions must be freely available.' 3 7 This argument ignores Crosby's reliance upon the clear import of an "except as otherwise provided" phrase as well as the Crosby
Court's silence regarding the concept of field occupation.' 38 The
Mezzanatto majority relied upon the alternative theory of field occupation to distinguish Crosby and ignore its clear and unambiguous precedent. Without such distinction, the nearly identical "except as
otherwise provided" language examined in Crosby and included in the
Crosby, 113 S. Ct. at 751 (quoting FED. R. CRiM. P. 43).
130 Interestingly, the unanimous Court in Crosby included justices Rehnquist, Kennedy,
Scalia and Thomas, the four justices who form the core of the majority in Mezzanatto.
131 Crosby, 113 S. Ct. at 751 (emphasis added).
132 Id. at 753.
'33 Id.
134 United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 802 (1995).
135 Id.
36 Id.
137 Id.
138 Crosby, 113 S. Ct. at 751.
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plea-statement Rules directs the Court to bar any implicit waiver
exception.
2.

The Legislative History Indicates CongressionalIntent to Foreclose a
Defendant From Waiving the Rules' Protections

The legislative history of the plea-statement Rules provides additional grounds to challenge the majority's reliance on the presumption of waiver. 13 9 Justice Souter looked to the Advisory Committees'
Notes on Rules 410 and 11(e) (6) to support the argument that Congress intended to place the plea-statement Rules beyond the possibility of waiver.1 40 He noted that the Advisory Committee promulgated
the Rule 410 to promote the "disposition of criminal cases by compromise." 14 1 The stated, primary purpose of the plea-statement Rules directly addresses the dilemma that "the federal judicial system could
not possibly litigate every civil and criminal case filed in the courts." 14 2
In order to effectuate the disposition of cases through settlement, the
Advisory Committee saw the need to create a zone of "unrestrained
candor."'14 3 Congress enacted the plea-statement Rules to create and
protect the conditions of unrestrained candor necessary to encourage
settlements. 144 In addressing Congress' choice of method to encourage the disposition of criminal cases by settlement, Justice Souter
correctly noted:
Whether Congress was right or wrong that unrestrained candor is
necessary to promote a reasonable number of plea agreements, Congress assumed that there was such a need, and meant to satisfy it by [the
plea-statement] Rules. Since the zone of unrestrained candor is diminished whenever a defendant has to stop to think about the amount of
trouble his openness may cause him if the plea negotiations fall through,
Congress must have understood that the judicial system's interest in candid plea discussions would be threatened by recognizing waivers under
Rules 410 and 11(e) (6).145
The Court erred by not deferring to Congress' determination
that there must be no restrictions on a defendant's candor in plea
discussions. 146 In fact, Congress specifically rejected the particular restriction on candor that the majority's opinion endorsed, the use of
plea-statements for impeachment purposes. 47 Congress promulgated
139 Mezzanatto, 115 S. CL at 807-08 (Souter, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 807 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C. app. at 750).
142 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
143 FED. R.CRIM. P. ll(e)(6) Advisory Committee's Note, 77 F.R.D. 507,
144 Mezzanatto, 115 S.Ct. at 807-08 (Souter, J., dissenting).
145
146
147

533 (1978).

Id. at 808 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 806, 808 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Recall that Congress removed the use of plea-statements for impeachment purposes

1996]

PLEA-STATEMENT RULES

1455

the plea-statement Rules to help dispose of criminal cases by compromise. In doing so, Congress established a systemic safeguard that operated by providing the defendant protection from his own plearelated statements or reconsidered pleas of guilty or no/o contendere.14 8
B.

THE RULES PROVIDE SYSTEMIC, NOT MERELY PERSONAL PROTECTIONS

The fact that the plea-statement Rules create something more
than a personal right bears important ramifications in assessing the
waivability of the Rules.' 4 9 "Where a private right is granted in the
public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so
charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed where
it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate."' 5 0 By tracing the legislative history and policies behind the Rules
and recognizing the public interests served in settling cases, Justice
Souter directly answers the majority's challenge to establish a basis to
conclude that the Rules are beyond the ambit of the general presumption favoring waiver.' 5 1
The majority demonstrated the breadth of the presumption by
listing examples of rights and evidentiary rules that parties may waive
by agreement. 15 2 The examples provided by the Court establish that a
presumption exists, but no faction of the Court disputed the general
recognition of the ability to waive rights and evidentiary provisions in
most cases. The Court failed to establish that the plea-statement Rules
are more like the examples cited to demonstrate the general rule than
the type of systemic protection Justice Souter argues that parties cannot waive.
The majority, for example, refers to evidentiary stipulations to
the admissibility of evidence made in preparation for trial and waiver
of hearsay objections at trial to demonstrate that the presumption of
waivability exists within the Rules of Evidence.' 5 3 For example, in
Tupman Thurlow v. Castillo'5 4 and United States v. Wing, 55 the Second

and Ninth Circuits respectively allowed parties to enter into stipulations that evidence was authentic and admissible. Similarly, in Sac and
Fox Indians of the Mississippi in Iowa v. Sac and Fox Indians of the Missisas an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 410 after passing Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure lI(e) (6). See supra parts I.A, II.B.
148 Id. at 808 (Souter, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
150 Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945).
151 See Mezanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 803.
152 Id. at 801-02.
153 Id. at 802.

154 490 F.2d 302, 309 (2d Cir. 1974).
155 450 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1971).
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sippi in Oklahoma,156 the Court determined that hearsay evidence was
properly admissible at trial by the consent of both parties.
Although the examples cited by the Court demonstrate that the
presumption favoring waiver exists within the Rules of Evidence, they
all involve preparation for and the facilitation of trial. 15 7 The primary
objective of the plea-statement Rules, however, is to avoid trial
through compromise. 158 While the plea-statement Rules may ultimately impact the admissibility of evidence at trial, they exist in order
to influence the behavior of the parties in a pre-trial setting.1 -', In this
sense, the plea-statement Rules are unlike the vast majority of the
Rules of Evidence. 160 By allowing waiver of the plea-statement Rules
at the negotiation stage, the Court compromises the means by which
Congress attempted to promote the systemic goal of settling cases. 6 l
Waiver of the plea-statement Rules at trial, on the other hand,
would not compromise the systemic goal of settling cases. By the time
a case progresses to trial, settlement negotiations have presumably
failed, and the systemic considerations have disappeared. At this
point, the plea-statement Rules only function to protect the defendant's right to exclude from evidence what he said during plea discussions, and waiver would not implicate Congress' goals in passing the
Rules. If, for some reason, a defendant wanted to waive the plea-statement protections at trial rather than prior to or during an attempt to
reach a settlement, the waiver would more closely resemble the examples cited by the Court in support of the general presumption favoring waiver. 162 In this limited context, waiver of the plea-statement
Rules would not be inconsistent with Congressional intent; nonethe156 220 U.S. 481. 488 (1910).
157 Justice Thomas argues that "[d] uring the course of trial, parties frequently decide to
waive evidentiary objections, and such tactics are routinely honored by trial judges." Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 802 (citing 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAm, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5032, at 161 (1977)).
158 FED. R. EVID. 410 Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 228 (1972).
159 By creating a "zone of unrestrained candor," the plea-statement Rules attempt to
create an atmosphere in which the disposition of cases by compromise is most likely. See
supra part V.A.2.
160 A very small handful of the Federal Rules of Evidence attempt to affect pre-trial behavior. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which generally excludes evidence of
subsequent remedial measures, attempts to encourage people to take steps in furtherance
of safety. FED. R. EvID. 407 Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 225 (1972). Similarly, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 (often referred to as the "Rape Shield Statute") offers
evidentiary protections to alleged victims of a sex offense in order to encourage victims of
sexual misconduct to report crimes and participate in the prosecution of alleged offenders.
FED. R. E'ID. 412 Advisory Committee's Note, H.R. CONF REP No. 711, 103rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 383 (1994).
161 United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 808 (1995) (Souter,J., dissenting).
162 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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less, the plain language of the Rules would still bar waiver.16 3
C.

PROSECUTORIAL DEMAND OF WAIVER FORCES DEFENDANTS TO ENTER
INVALID CONTRACTS OF ADHESION

164
Principles of contract law govern the realm of plea bargaining.
Defendants usually have no leverage to challenge demands for waivers
of the plea-statement Rules, "and the use of waiver provisions as contracts of adhesion has become accepted practice." 165 A danger inherent in the plea bargaining system is that the criminal defendant will
yield valuable procedural rights simply because his bargaining posi166
tion is so inferior to that of the prosecutor.
The majority rejected the idea that prosecutors unfairly force
waiver of the plea-statement Rules upon criminal defendants. 1 67 The
Court stated, "The plea bargaining process necessarily exerts pressure
on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of fundamental
rights, but we have repeatedly held that the government 'may en:
courage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the
plea.""168 While the majority refers to the defendant's ability to gain
substantial benefits in exchange for pleading guilty, waiver of the pleastatement Rules brings no such benefits to the accused. The defendant who actually pleads guilty can offer his plea in exchange for a
lesser charge, leniency in sentencing, or protection from further prosecution. 16 9 The waiver examined by the Court in Mezzanatto achieves
comparatively little, if anything at all, for the criminal defendant.1 7 0
In the case at hand, Mezzanatto and the prosecutor had already
begun their meeting before the prosecutor demanded that Mezzanatto waive his rights to the plea-statement Rules for impeachment
purposes.' 7 ' When the prosecutor demanded that Mezzanatto waive
the plea-statement Rules, he offered nothing in exchange beyond continuing the meeting at his discretion.17 2 Mezzanatto, on the other
hand, relinquished a substantial evidentiary protection. The prosecutor enjoyed the benefit of that waiver without sacrificing anything

163 See supra part VAL. for a discussion of the plain language of the plea-statement
Rules.
164
165
166
167
168
169

United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1446 (10th Cir. 1990).
Me=anatto,115 S. Ct. at 809 (SouterJ., dissenting).
United States v. Schaffer, 12 M.J. 425, 428 (C.MA 1982).
Mezzanatto, 115 S. C. at 806.
Id. at 805-06 (quoting Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978)).
See, e.g., United States v. Ailsworth, 899 F. Supp. 511 (D. Kan. 1995).
170 See Mezzanao, 115 S. Ct. at 800 (presenting situation where waiver of plea-statement
Rule necessary to continue conversation with prosecutor).
171 Id.
172 Id.
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more than the time necessary to allow Mezzanatto to offer his statement.1 73 The majority erred in comparing such an unbalanced exchange with a plea-bargain in which both prosecutor and defendant
gain the mutual benefit of avoiding trial. 174
D.

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

The Court's decision may render the plea-statement Rules "dead
letters."' 75 The majority's implicit waiver exception allows prosecutors
and the defendants from whom they demand a plea-statement waiver
to circumvent the explicit provisions of the Rules. As evidence that
the impeachment waiver is beginning to swallow up the protections of
the Rules, the dissent cited the growing practice among prosecutors of
routinely requiring such a waiver.' 76 In arguing the validity of waiver
for impeachment purposes, the majority states, "[i]f prosecutors decide that certain crucial information will be gained only by preserving
the inadmissibility of plea statements, they will agree to leave intact
the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules." 177 This statement is revealing for several reasons. First, it suggests that the default
practice of prosecutors will be to rely on waiver for impeachment
rather than the explicit provisions of the plea-statement Rules. 178 The
majority indicates that prosecutors will defer to the protections afforded a defendant in the Rules only in instances where the information needed from defendants is crucial.1 79 Therefore, according to
the majority, defendants with anything less than crucial information
will be forced to forego the protections of the plea-statement Rules.1 80
In addition, by indicating that prosecutors may agree to leave intact
173 The majority's opinion allows a prosecutor to demand waiver prior to beginning plea
negotiations, extract a confession or other evidence detrimental to the defendant's case,
and end the discussion without conceding anything.
174 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 S. Ct. 357, 363 (1978) ("[p] lea-bargaining flows from
a 'mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for
wanting to avoid trial" (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970))).
175 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct at 806 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 808-09 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Petition for Certiorari at 10-11 and
United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1396 (3d Cir. 1991)) ("Plea agreements.. . commonly contain a provision stating that proffer information that is disclosed during the
course of plea negotiations is ... admissible for purposes of impeachment.").
177 Id. at 805.
178 Nothing in the opinion prevents this result. Ironically, this hails widespread use for
impeachment purposes of statements made during plea settlement negotiations back into
practice. This is specifically what Congress chose to exclude from Federal Rule of Evidence 410 in its first revision. See supranotes 16-19 and accompanying text.
179 Mezzanaito, 115 S. Ct. at 805.
180 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 1994 WL 757606 (1994) (Oral Argument) (Government conceding that defendants are usually in no position to challenge demands for impeachment waivers).
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the provisions of the plea-statement Rules, the Court places the operation of the Rules within the realm of prosecutorial discretion.
Additionally, prosecutorial demand for waiver of the Rules' exclusionary provisions may expand beyond admissibility for impeachment
and force defendants to allow the Government to use their plea-statements for the case in chief.18 ' In examihing the possibility that prosecutors will expand the scope of their demands for waiver, Justice
Souter pointed out the lack of any distinction within the Rules between the use of a statement for impeachment purposes and use in
the prosecutor's case-in-chief.1 8 2 Such an expansion of the Government's waiver demands would circumvent entirely the purposes of the
plea-statement Rules.
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion reveals a possible rift
within the Court, giving credence to Justice Souter's fears that prosecutors will expand the waiver exception to the point of swallowing up
the Rules. 8 3 The primary message ofJustice Ginsburg's concurrence
was to state her understanding that the Court's opinion did nothing
more than recognize a limited waiver allowing prosecutors to impeach
defendants with statements made during plea negotiations. 8 4 If Justice Thomas had desired, he could have obviated the need for a separate concurring opinion by adding to his opinion a single line limiting
the Court's decision to waivers for impeachment purposes; however,
no such clarification appears in the Court's decision. It appears that
Justice Thomas was unwilling to so limit his opinion to preventJustice
Ginsburg from writing separately.
Justice Thomas' unwillingness to limit the Court's opinion to
waivers for impeachment purposes indicates his likely view that prosecutors should be able to demand waivers of the plea-statement Rules
for use in the case-in-chief.' 8 5 Justice Thomas may have been prevented from explicitly stating this view for fear of losing Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Breyer to the dissent. Had Justice Thomas
forced the concurringJustices to choose between justice Souter's position of barring waiver of the plea-statement Rules entirely and the opposite extreme of allowing complete waiver of the Rules he might
have found himself writing for a dissenting faction of the Court rather
the majority. The foregoing discussion of the split within the Court is
admittedly speculative, but it suggests that wholesale waiver of the
181 Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 809 (Souter,J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
183 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

184 Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
185 It follows that ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia who also did
not join injustice Ginsburg's concurrence, share Justice Thomas' view.
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plea-statement Rules may have been the decisive issue for the Justices.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Justice Thomas incorrectly determined that defendants can waive
the protections of the plea-statement Rules. The majority's adherence
to the general presumption of waiver in the context of the Rules' exclusionary provisions ignored the plain language of the Rules. In addition, Congress' clear purpose in enacting the plea-statement Rules
as well as the Rules' legislative history indicates that the general presumption favoring waiver should not apply. The Court's decision erroneously endorses the widespread use of waiver to circumvent the
provisions of the plea-statement Rules for impeachment purposes
and, perhaps, the prosecution's case-in-chief as well.
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